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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE
This court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant
to the provisions of Section 78-2A-3(g), Utah Code Ann, (eff.
Jan.

1,

1988),

as this is an appeal

involving a divorce.

from a final order

After trial in January, 1986, the court

entered its Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree

of Divorce granting appellant, Mrs. Jense, a divorce under

her Counterclaim on July 9, 1986.
court granted

On December 7, 1987, the

respondent' s Motion to Amend the Decree of

Divorce after determining that there had been significant
changes of circumstances rendering ineffective the court' s
prior decision effecting its intention to equally divide the
marital estate of the parties.

The court then amended the

original Decree of Divorce in order to achieve the equitable
distribution
moderated

originally

enforcement

contemplated.
of

The Order

further

judgment

on the

a subsequent

original Decree of Divorce obtained by appellant, Mrs. Jense,
on April

1, 1987.

On December 8, 1987, the court denied

appellant' s Motion for a New Trial.

Appellant appeals the

court' s Order to Amend and the court' s denial of her Motion
for New Trial.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by: (1)
Amending

the

original

Decree

of

Divorce

and

moderating

enforcement of a subsequent judgment obtained thereon after a
showing of substantial change in circumstances, in order to
achieve the equitable distribution originally intended by the
court;

(2) Granting

defendant' s counsel

plaintiff's

Motion

consented to proceed
2

to Amend

after

on the basis of

affidavits before the court.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES.
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Section

30-3-5(3),

Utah

Code

Ann.

(1953)

provides:
The court has continuing jurisdiction to
make subsequent changes or new orders for
the support and maintenance of the
parties. . . or the distribution of the
property as is reasonable and necessary.
Rule

9,

Supplementary

Rules

of Practice, Third

Judicial District (eff. 6/1/87):
Modifications of Divorce Decrees.
a. When a modification in the terms and
conditions of a Decree of Divorce is
sought, the issue shall be raised by
filing a Petition for Modification and
service of said petition and summons upon
the opposing party in accordance with the
requirements of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
No request for
change or modification of a Decree shall
be raised by an order to show cause.
b. After a responsive pleading is filed,
and discovery has been completed, counsel
shall file a certificate of readiness for
trial, and the matter shall then be heard
by the assigned judge.
c. No petition for modification shall be
placed on any law and motion or order to
show cause calendar without the consent
of the judge to whom the case is
assigned.
3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Trial in this matter was held on January 4, 1986
(R.

85) after which

the

court,

by memorandum

divided the property of the parties (R. 86-88).

decision,

Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce effecting
the court's decision were entered on July 9, 1986 (R. 108115, 123-129).

In order to equalize the marital estate, the

court ordered a property settlement in which the plaintiff
was required to pay certain lump sums to the defendant.

The

judgment was based upon a pattern where the plaintiff, for
many years, had been paid a substantial bonus in February or
March of each year, based upon the earnings of his employer
for the prior year (R. 112-113; Tr. of Aug. 29, 1987 hearing,
p. 14).
On April

1,

1987, defendant

obtained

judgment

against the plaintiff in the amount of $43,314.46 pursuant to
the Decree (R. 144).

However, the plaintiff did not receive

his 1986 bonus (R. 173) and, as a result, the trial court, on
April 6, 1987, stayed execution on the $43,314.46 judgment
for a period of four months (R. 146-148).
The plaintiff was terminated from his employment on
July 17, 1987 (R. 173).
4

The house owned by the parties in Utah County which
had been valued by the court at the time of the divorce at
$150,000.00, was sold in 1987 for a net selling price of
approximately $119,000.00.

The net proceeds of that sale

were approximately $20, 000. 00 in contrast to the $50,000.00
the court believed

at the time of the divorce would be

produced by the sale of that property (R. 261-262).
The plaintiff requested the trial court to amend
the Decree and to moderate enforcement of the April 1, 1987,
judgment in order to accomplish the court7 s original intent
to divide the marital estate equally (R. 167-168; 169-171).
At

the August

24,

1987, hearing

defendant' s counsel
affidavits

rather

hearing, p. 2).
(R. 260-264).

on plaintiff s motions,

consented to proceed on the basis of

than testimony

(Tr.

of Aug.

29, 1987

The court granted the plaintiff's request

Now, defendant contends that the trial court

erred in doing so.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court' s discretion to modify a divorce
decree in light of substantially changed circumstances must
be accorded considerable deference.
evidence

of

a change

Based upon proffered

in circumstances,
5

the

trial

court

modified the Decree of Divorce, and this court should now
affirm that judgment.
Defendant' s counsel waived the right to proceed to
trial under Rule 9 of the Supplementary Rules of Practice of
the

Third

Judicial

District.

The

trial

court

had

the

inherent power to accept counsel7 s waiver of compliance with
that rule.

ARGUMENT
This

court

and

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

have

consistently adhered to the firmly established principle that
the trial court' s decisions are to be accorded considerable
deference in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.
See, £. a. , Bovle v.

Bovle, 735 P. 2d 669 (Utah App. 1987);

Fletcher v. Fletcher. 615 P. 2d 1218 (Utah 1980).

There is no

such abuse extant in the present case, and the trial court' s
decision should be affirmed.
A.
changed

The

trial

circumstances,

court,
exercised

recognizing
its

substantially

equitable

powers to

modify the divorce decree.
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled, construing and
applying Section 30-3-5(3), Utah Code Ann.

(1953), that a

decree of divorce may be modified upon the showing of "a
6

substantial change of circumstances of the parties occurring
since the entry of the decree and not contemplated in the
decree itself. "
1983).

Lea v. Bowers, 658 P. 2d 1213, 1215 (Utah

The court, quoting from its prior decision in Land v.

Land, 605 P. 2d 1248 (Utah 1980), observed:
It is likewise true that the court
retains continuing jurisdiction over the
parties and may modify the decree due to
a change in circumstances, equitable
considerations again to govern.
658 P. 2d at 1215.
In the instant case, the plaintiff requested the
court

to modify

the decree based

changes of circumstance.

on several

substantial

At the time of the decree, the

plaintiff had experienced a pattern for many years of being
paid a substantial bonus in February or March of each year,
according to the earnings of his employer for the prior year.
Based

upon

that

established

pattern,

the

court

divided

equally between the parties the bonus that was due in 1986
for the 1985 earnings year, and required the plaintiff to pay
to the defendant a lump sum of $27, 750. 00 plus interest (R.
112).

The court also required the plaintiff, according to

the parties' then current financial circumstances, to pay
alimony for one year to the defendant and to pay for the
defendant's attorney's fees (R. 112-113).
7

The plaintiff's

right to enforce the collection of the lump sum award and the
alimony and attorney' s fees did not accrue until April 1,
1987 (R. 112-113).

The court's stated reason for the delayed

right of enforcement was in order to give the plaintiff an
opportunity to receive his income bonus for the 1986 earnings
year (R. 113).
On April 1, 1987, the court reduced all sums due to
the plaintiff to judgment in the amount of $43, 314. 46 (R.
144).
The

circumstances

contemplated

in

the

Decree

changed, however, and the plaintiff did not receive his 1986
income

bonus

because

his

employer

financial difficulties (R. 173).

had

suffered

severe

In addition, plaintiff, in

an attempt to meet his obligations, sold his home in Pleasant
Grove, Utah, which had been awarded to him in the Decree of
Divorce.

That home had been valued by the court at the time

of the divorce at $150,000.00.
for

a

net

selling

price

of

The 1987 sale of the home was
approximately

$119,000.00,

producing a net proceed of approximately $20,000.00.

The

court had originally believed that the equity in the home
would be between $50,000.00 and $60,000.00 (R. 261-262).
Because the plaintiff s financial and employment
situation was unclear, the court stayed execution on the
8

$43,314.46 judgment for four months while prohibiting the
plaintiff from alienating or encumbering any of his property
(R. 146-148).
The plaintiff was terminated from his employment in
July, 1987 (R. 173).
The defendant argues on appeal that these changed
circumstances

do

not

relate

to the

bases

on which the

original property distribution awards were made.

On the

contrary,

the

related

thereto.

The Findings of Fact clearly show that the court

changed

circumstances

are directly

was attempting to equalize the marital estate, and that the
plaintiff s anticipated bonuses were a primary basis for each
award.
was

Finding of Fact No. 11 (R. 105), regarding alimony,

based

upon

the

parties'

then

current

financial

circumstances and those were such that defendant would not be
allowed

to

enforce

payment

of the alimony

plaintiff had received his 1986 bonus.
12

(R.

award

until

Finding of Fact No.

105-106), which addresses the award of attorney's

fees, was also based on the parties' disparity of incomes and
similarly postpones the obligation to pay until after receipt
of the 1986 bonus.
104)

regarding

So, too, does Finding of Fact No. 9 (R.

the

lump-sum

property

award,

give

the

plaintiff a grace period until after the award of the 1986
9

bonus.

The trial court, in the August 24, 1987, hearing on

plaintiff s Motion

to Amend,

reiterated

the presumption

inherent in the divorce proceedings that the plaintiff would
receive his income bonus.
The court: "Well, I think it is a tough
thing to know what to do because it is
true that the property settlement was
based upon the presumption that he was
going to get a pretty big bonus, because
he always had. "
Tr. , Aug. 24, 1987, p. 14.
The

lump-sum property

award was based upon the

court' s valuation at the time of the decree of the assets
owned by the parties.

The $150,000.00 due in the Pleasant

Grove home was awarded to plaintiff.

The drop in value was

not foreseen at the time of the Decree.
As stated by the court in the August 24, 1987,
hearing:
. [T]he bottom line, you know, after
everything happened, that we didn' t
foresee considering the drop in value of
the property . . . .
Tr. , Aug. 24, 1987, p. 16.
The court,
estate,

had assumed the

t h a t the p l a i n t i f f
the

in i t s

changed

attempt t o e q u a l i z e the

marital

house t o be worth $150,000.00

would receive his income bonus.

circumstances

directly
10

relate

and

Clearly,
to

those

assumptions.
The defendant
awards

argues that the property division

are entitled to greater sanctity than alimony and

child support awards, and that modification should be granted
"only

upon

showing

of

compelling

reasons

arising

from

substantial and material changes of circumstances. *' However,
the Utah Supreme Court in Chandler v. West, 610 P. 2d 1299
(Utah

1980),

ruled

that while property

settlements

are

entitled to greater sanctity, they are not sacrosanct, and it
is not beyond the power of the trial court of equity to
modify them.

Id. at 1300.

In the cases cited by the defendant in support of
her argument that property awards are entitled to greater
sanctity, the courts were construing a decree based upon the
stipulation and property settlement agreement entered into by
the parties, not an award made by

the court after trial.

For example, in Land v. Land, 605 P. 2d 1248 (Utah 1980), the
court stated that once the parties reach an agreement, it can
be modified

only when

circumstances.

there is a significant

change of

The court found it salient that the parties

themselves had reached an overall integrated agreement and
found that modification of any particular part should not be
undertaken without examination of how the whole agreement fit

11

together.
More

analogous

to the instant situation is the

Court' s decision in Chandler, supra, wherein the parties had
entered into a stipulated

decree which provided that the

plaintiff should be awarded the parties' home and that the
defendant would make all mortgage payments on the property.
Thereafter, Shirley West Chandler sold the home for a gain of
$14,000.00 and remarried.

The defendant then stopped making

the mortgage

Mrs. West brought the defendant

payments.

before the court, asking that he be required to continue
making payments until he had paid her the total of the amount
of the mortgage indebtedness as of the date of the divorce.
The defendant responded that the remarriage of the plaintiff
and the sale of the home constituted a material change in
circumstances justifying a modification of the decree.

The

trial court declined to modify the decree.
The Supreme Court recognized that, unlike the trial
court

in

Land

distribution

of

v.

Land.

supra,

which

was

specific

assets

pursuant

dealing
to

with

a property

settlement, the Chandler trial court was addressing an order
for the payment of a monthly mortgage obligation.

It was

observed that, if the payment was support, the trial court
could

eliminate

that

payment

if support
12

was

no

longer

required.

If it were a property division and there were

obviously changed circumstances, the Court stated that, under
traditional equity standards, the Decree could be modified,
citing Le Breton v. Le Breton, 604 P.2d 469 (Utah 1979), 610
P. 2d at 1300.
findings

and

The Court then remanded the case for specific
conclusions

regarding

the character

of the

required payments.
Examination of the instant matter against Land v.
Land, supra, and Chandler v. West, supra, demonstrates that
the trial

court below was well within its

powers to modify the decree.

discretionary

Unlike Land v. Land, the trial

court herein was not asked to modify a decree based upon a
stipulated property settlement.

Rather, the court below was

asked to re-examine its own decision.

No issue of what the

parties intended in a stipulation is presented in this case,
rather, the Court was effecting its own intent.
A

similar problem

was

resolved

in Thompson v.

Thompson. 709 P. 2d 360 (Utah 1985), wherein an obligation to
pay a debt was not considered at the time of the divorce.
Examining that situation, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the
trial

court's

modification of the decree to provide for

payment of the unrecognized obligation.
the trial

In the instant case,

court had declared its intent in the original
13

Decree to divide the marital estate equally (R. 127).

Two

years later, the premises upon which the property division
awards were made were no longer extant.
simply

modified

presumptions

the

decree

incorporated

based

The trial court has
on

the

in the original

change

in

Decree and its

action are well within its discretionary powers.
Defendant also argues that the alimony award may
not be modified, as the payments vested in the defendant as
they accrued.
the

court

While defendant' s initial premise is correct,

does

have

equitable

enforcement of alimony arrearages.

power

to

moderate

the

In Adams v. Adams. 593

P. 2d 147 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court, while finding
that a trial court has no power to modify a decree as to the
vested alimony rights, also recognized that the court does
have the power in equity to moderate the enforcement of
accrued and unpaid alimony.

Jjjl. at 147, fn. 2.

Such an

invocation of the court' s equitable powers was made by the
non-custodial parent in Harmon v. Harmon. 491 P. 2d 231 (Utah
1971).

The Supreme Court found that a judgment in a divorce

proceeding is of a different and higher character than a
judgment in a suit at law.
In order to carry out the important
responsibility of safeguarding the
interest and welfare of children, it has
always been deemed that courts have broad
14

equitable powers.
To accept the
plaintiff s contention that the adjudged
arrearage is tantamount to a judgment in
law would, in the long run, tend to
impair rather than enhance the abilities
of both the plaintiff and the court to
accomplish the desired objective.
Id. at 232.

The court recognized that, in carrying out the

objective of protecting the welfare of the children, it was
necessary to alter the ordinary post-judgment collection of
the debt, and the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court' s
Order

to

Stay

Execution

on

the

accrued

child

support

payments.
In the instant

case, the trial

court similarly

exercised its equitable powers to moderate enforcement of the
alimony debt.

Finding of Fact No. 11 (R. 105) recognized the

plaintiff s expectation of a large bonus with which he could
pay the awarded alimony.

The court' s subsequent Order merely

equitably altered the plaintiffs obligation to reflect the
substantially changed circumstance that the plaintiff did not
receive that bonus.
Indeed, the court' s Order arguably did not even
change that alimony judgment.

While it had been expected

that plaintiff s bonus would be used to pay that award,
ultimately,
house,

which

the
had

$20,000.00

equity

in the Pleasant Grove

been plaintiff s prior
15

to the

court' s

modification
263).

order

(R.

124), was

awarded

to defendant

Her judgment for alimony was $5,549.80

(R.

(R. 160), and

that sum was more than adequately offset by the proceeds from
the house' s equity.
No
defendant.
moderate

abuse

of

discretion

has

been

shown

by

the

in the court' s order to modify the Decree and to

defendant's

judgment

thereon.

The Record

fully

supports the court' s modification and the defendant' s appeal
on these matters must fail.
B.

The defendant' s counsel waived the right to a

trtftl ynfler Supplementary W e

9.

Defendant's failure to timely object to the format
of

the

August

defendant' s

24,

right

1987,
to

a

hearing
full

constitutes

trial

under

a waiver

Rule

9

of

of
the

Supplementary Rules of Practice of the District Court (eff.
June 6, 1987).
Sperry v. Smith, 694 P. 2d 581 (Utah 1984), is cited
by the defendant in support of its contention that the trial
court herein has abused its discretion by failing to comply
with its own rules.

In Sperry, the Utah Supreme Court found

that the trial court had abused its discretion by refusing to
set

aside

a summary

judgment

after it was

brought

to its

attention that plaintiff s attorney had failed to comply with
16

Rule 2. 5 of the Rules of Practice of the District Courts of
the State of Utah.

The Rule required plaintiff s attorney in

that case to give written notice to defendants to either
appoint another attorney or appear in person at the hearing
on the Motion for Summary Judgment.

Since no notice had been

given, the Summary Judgment was vacated by the Utah Supreme
Court and the case remanded for further proceedings.

The

Court' s rationale was based on the fact that there had been
no waiver by the defendants of the protection afforded by
that Rule.
While it may be true that in
certain instances, trial courts have the
inherent powers to waive compliance with
their own rules, no reason has been
suggested here why there should have been
a waiver.
674 P. 2d at 583.
Clearly, in the instant case, defendant waived the
right to a full trial under Rule 9.
opportunity

The defendant had ample

to object to the format of the hearing, but

failed to do so.

Defendant was mailed a Notice of Hearing on

the Motion to Amend the Decree on August 3, 1987 (R. 179180),

and had an opportunity to object to the calendared

hearing at that time.

Defendant had further opportunity to

object in her Answer to plaintiff's
17

Motion to Amend the

Decree.
filed

No objection was made in that Answer, which was

on August

21,

1987

(R.

265-274).

At the hearing

itself, plaintiff' s counsel was prepared to offer testimony,
but defendant' s counsel agree to proceed on the basis of
affidavits
through

(Tr. Aug.

the

24, 1987, p. 2).

hearing

did

defendant's

objection to the proceeding.

Not until midway
counsel

raise

any

Even at that point, counsel was

willing to continue with the hearing as long as the court was
willing to rule in defendant' s favor on the merits.
(Mr. Peterson):
If the court is genuinely interested
and believes there is a basis for
consideration of modification of the
property distribution, then I think we
have a right to a complete trial and open
that issue, rather than this very short
hearing and these proffers of counsel,
which is coming before the court today. .
[W]e don't think there's sufficient
cause for even a consideration of change
of the property; but if there is, then we
believe we are entitled to a complete
trial . . . .

Tr. , Aug. 24, 1987, pp. 9-10.
While

in

Sperrv,

supra,

no

reason

had

been

suggested why there should have been a waiver, in the instant
case, no reason has been suggested why there should not have
been a waiver.

Counsel's "clear and strenuous" objection to

18

the format of the proceeding was not heard until midway
through that proceeding.
Bank & Trust Co. .

Similarly, in Goeltz v. Continental

299 P. 2d 832 (Utah 1956), the defendant

waited until midway through trial to invoke protection under
Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendant had

been surprised by new evidence that weakened another defense
and wished at that point to rely on its previously waived
statute of limitations defense.

The trial court refused to

amend the pleadings pursuant to Rule 15, and the Utah Supreme
Court affirmed, noting that the surprise testimony had no
bearing on the statute of limitations defense and the facts
that were determined were known to defendant at the inception
of plaintiff s claim.
The defendant herein has made no suggestion that
any new turn of events gave rise to the objection brought
midway through the hearing on plaintiff's Motion to Amend.
It appears from defendant' s counsel' s argument to the court
that a potential unfavorable ruling was the only basis for
the objection.
supra,

the

In accordance with Sperry, supra, and Goeltz.

trial

court did not abuse its discretion in

accepting defendant's waiver of a full trial and denying the
subsequent oral and written objections.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In

this

case,

the

court

was

well

within

its

discretion in amending the Decree of Divorce to effect equity
between the parties.

As a result of circumstances beyond the

control of the parties, the parties' home in Pleasant Grove
sold for $30,000.00 less than the court believed it was worth
at the time of the entry of the Decree.

In addition, the

plaintiff

bonus

was

not

paid

a

substantial

that

was

contemplated at the time of the Decree and subsequently lost
his job.

None of these circumstances was anticipated by the

court or the parties at the time of the divorce.
The Decree in this matter was not entered by the
court pursuant to agreement of the parties.

It was a ruling

of

susceptible

the

court.

modification

It

by

the

is,

therefore,

court.

The

more

trial

court

has

to

effected

modification of the Decree so that the original intent of the
Decree,

i. e. ,

estate,

can

the

be

equitable

achieved.

distribution

The

trial

of

court's

the

marital

rulings

are

within its equitable powers, and should be affirmed by this
court.
The

procedure

effected was proper.

by

which

this

modification

was

Any right to trial that the defendant

had under Rule 9 of the Supplementary Rules of Practice of
20

the Third Judicial District was waived.

The trial court' s

orders as a result of that hearing should be affirmed by this
court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed four
(4)

true

copies

Brief, this

of

the

above

and

foregoing

Respondent's

C^ day of woflo, 1988, to:
Mr. Craig M. Peterson
Mr. E. Paul Wood
Attorneys for Appellant
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
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/

B. L. DART ( 8 1 8 )

i"-r. C D I -

Attorney for Defendant
Suite 1330
310 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
GARY W. JENSE,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
v«
SARA A. JENSE,

Civil No. D85-702

Defendant.

Judge Daniels
oooOooo

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
on the 14th day of January, 1986, plaintiff appearing in person
and by his attorney, David S. Dolowitz, and defendant appearing
in person and by her attorney, B. L. Dart, and each of the
parties having testified to matters in their respective complaint
and counterclaim and the matter having been argued and submitted
and taken under advisement by the Court, and the Court now being
fully advised hereby makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendant is a resident of Salt Lake County, State

of Utah, and has been for more than three months immediately
prior to the filing of this action for divorce.

r

f f
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2.

Plaintiff and defendant were married in Las Vegas,

Nevada on the 10th day of January, 1953, and since that time have
been husband and wife,
3.

Plaintiff has treated defendant cruelly, causing

her great mental suffering and distress.

Among other things,

plaintiff has failed to meet defendant's emotional needs and
include her in the financial decisions of the marriage, which
conduct has made it impossible for defendant to continue with the
marriage relationship and entitles defendant to a decree of
divorce from plaintiff on her counterclaim.
4.

Plaintiff and defendant have four children as

issue of this marriage, all of whom are adults and emancipated,
and there are no issues of custody or support.
5.

The real property of the parties should be awarded

as follows:
a.

Plaintiff should be awarded the equity of the

parties in the house and real property at 9200 North 4650 West,
Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to the mortgage liabilities
outstanding thereon; the rental home at 582 West 850 North,
Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to the mortgage liabilities
outstanding thereon; the Tibbie Fork property and the residence
at 45 East 100 North, Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to plaintiff
assuming and paying the outstanding mortgage owing thereon.
b.

Defendant should be awarded the condominium

at 29 South State Street #718, Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to

the mortgage outstanding thereon,
6.

The personal property of the parties should be

awarded as follows:
a.

Plaintiff should be awarded the Dasher

automobile, the Cadillac automobile, the money in his checking
account, and the furniture and furnishings and other items of
personal property currently in his own possession except for the
items specifically awarded to defendant as provided in the next
following subparagraph.
b.

Defendant should be awarded the Ford

automobile, her retirement, the money in her checking account,
all the furniture and furnishings located in the condominium at
29 South State #718, Salt Lake City, Utah, and the following
items of furniture and personal property currently located in the
home occupied by plaintiff at 9200 North 4650 West, Pleasant
Grove, Utah:
Large antique copper frying pan
Antique church pew
French Provincial armchair
Nantucket rocking chair
Antique frame sampler
Hummel figurines
Bowl from Israel
Silver hurricane lamp

3
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Small spinning wheel planter
Collection of antique spoons
Sterling silver goblets
Silver chafing dish
Antique cradle
Rocking chair
Bicentennial pewter plates
Poster bed
Bowl and pitcher (gift from Aunt Louise
Watts)
Antique quilt/antique valentines
Antique quilt from defendant's grandmother
Moiri chair
Cross-stitch quilt
Bowl and pitcher (gift from defendant's
sister)
Four Lladro figurines
Various Royal Doulton figurines
Collection of "Coalport Cottages"
Defendant's clothing and personal effects,
including personal papers, books and items
which came from her— fami-ly such as photograph
albums, diaries and similar personal items.
7.

The parties should agree upon a time when defendant

can receive from plaintiff the items of property to be awarded to
defendant which are currently in plaintiff's possession, which

4
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time should be consistent with the schedule of the daughter of
the parties who is to arrange to pick up the items for defendant.
8.

The obligations and liabilities of the parties

should be assumed and paid as follows:
a.

Plaintiff should assume and pay the

various mortgage obligations owing on the real properties awarded
to him, the Zion's First National Bank note liability shown on
plaintiff's Exhibit P-l, any income tax liability for his 1985
income, and any obligations which he has individually incurred
since the separation of the parties in June, 1984.
b.

Defendant should assume and pay her student

loan, her installment obligations, and any obligations which she
has individually incurred since the separation of the parties in
June, 1984.
9.

In order to equalize the marital estate, defendant

should be awarded a judgment from plaintiff in the sum of $27,750
with interest thereon at the legal rate of 12% from February 24,
1986, until paid in full.

This obligation should be paid by

plaintiff on or before April 1, 1987, and until paid this
obligation should constitute a lien agaiirst^prlaintif ff s real
property located in Utah County as provided in paragraph 5a above.
10.

As an alimony award from plaintiff to defendant,

plaintiff should pay defendant an amount equal to one-half of the
gross bonus earned by plaintiff in 1985 which will be received in

5

1986, and upon receipt of the bonus, one-half of the gross bonus
should be paid to defendant.
11.

The Court finds that defendant based upon her

current employment is capable of supporting herself and for this
reason, the Court does not award permanent alimony.

However,

based upon the current financial circumstances of the parties,
plaintiff should pay to defendant temporary alimony in order to
give defendant the opportunity to establish herself, which
alimony should be in the amount of $500 per month for a period of
one-year commencing with the month of March, 1986, and with each
installment to be due and payable on the 1st day of the month.
Because of plaintiff's current financial
circumstances, however, defendant should engage in no action to
reduce these installments to judgment or enforce payment thereof
through execution until April 1, 1987, in order to allow
plaintiff an opportunity to receive his income bonus for the. 1986
income year.

Each installment of alimony should bear interest

from the date when due until paid at the rate of 10% per annum,
and if by April 1, 1987 any installments have not been paid, then
defendant should be entitled to reduce any-unpaid installments to
judgment and enforce collection through execution.
12.

In light of the disparity of the incomes and the

current financial circumstances of the parties, plaintiff should
be required to pay defendant's attorney's fees in the amount of
$5,000 together with all costs including appraisal costs incurred

by defendant in the sum of $670.

The obligation for attorney's

fees and costs should be due and payable by April 1, 1987 and
shall bear interest at the rate of 10% per annum until paid.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant is entitled to a divorce from plaintiff

on the grounds of mental cruelty, which decree shall be final
upon signing and entry.
2.

The real property of the parties is awarded as

provided in paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact.
3.

The personal property of the parties is awarded as

provided in paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact.
4.

The liabilities of the parties are to be assumed

and paid as provided in paragraph 8 of the Findings of Fact.
5.

Defendant is awarded a judgment from plaintiff in

the amount of $27,750 as property settlement to equalize the
marital estate plus interest thereon at the legal rate of 12% per
annum from February 24, 1986, until paid in full, with payment to
be made upon the terms and to be secured as provided in paragraph
9 of the Findings of Fact.
6.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay to defendant an

alimony award equal to one-half of the gross bonus earned by
plaintiff in 1985 which will be received in 1986, and upon

7
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receipt of the bonus, plaintiff is ordered to pay one-half of the
gross bonus to defendant,
7.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay to defendant temporary

alimony in the amount of $500 per month for a period of one-year
commencing with the month of March, 1986, to be paid upon the
terms provided in paragraph 11 of the Findings of Fact.
8.

Defendant is awarded a judgment for the use and

benefit of her attorney in the amount of $5,000 together with
costs in the amount of $670 incurred by defendant in this
divorce proceeding, to be paid upon the terms provided in
paragraph 12 of the Findings of Fact.
9.

Each of the parties is ordered to execute any

documents necessary to effectuate the terms of the Decree of
Divorce when it is entered.
DATED this &\

day of

vvJ - ( U

1986,

BY THE COURT:

ATTEST

^
DISTRICT JUDGE

DW'C»*AILJNG CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

^,4ay of

, 1986,.

I mailed a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law to:
David S. Dolowitz
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Attorney for Defendant.

B. L. DART (818)
Attorney for Defendant
Suite 1330
310 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo

GARY W. JENSE,

72^
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Plaintiff,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
v.
Civil No. D85-702

SARA A, JENSE,

Judge Daniels

Defendant.
oooOooo

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
on the 14th day of January, 1986, plaintiff appearing in person
and by his attorney, David S. Dolowitz, and defendant appearing
in person and by her attorney, B. L. Dart, and each of the
parties having testified to matters in their respective complaint
and counterclaim and the matter having been argued and submitted
and taken under advisement by the Court, and the Court having
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now
therefore,

aooii;

?••%'—»

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Defendant is awarded a decree of divorce from

plaintiff on the grounds of mental cruelty, which decree for good
cause shown shall be final upon signing and entry.
2.

Plaintiff and defendant have four children as

issue of this marriage, all of whom are adults and emancipated,
and there are no issues of custody or support,
3.

The real property of the parties is awarded

as follows:
a.

Plaintiff is awarded the equity of the

parties in the house and real property at 9200 North 4650 West,
Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to the mortgage liabilities
outstanding thereon; the rental home at 582 West 850 North,
Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to the mortgage liabilities
outstanding thereon; the Tibbie Fork property; and the residence
at 45 East 100 North, Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to plaintiff
assuming and paying the outstanding mortgage owing thereon.
b.

Defendant is awarded the condominium

at 29 South State Street #718, Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to
the mortgage outstanding thereon.
4.

The personal property of the parties is awarded as

follows:
a.

Plaintiff is awarded the Dasher automobile,

the Cadillac automobile, the money in his checking account, and
2

the furniture and furnishings and other items of personal
property currently in his own possession except for the items
specifically awarded to defendant as provided in the next
following subparagraph.
b.

Defendant is awarded the Ford automobile, her

retirement, the money in her checking account, all the furniture
and furnishings located in the condominium at 29 South State
#718, Salt Lake City, Utah, and the following items of furniture
and personal property currently located in the home occupied by
plaintiff at 9200 North 4650 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah:
Large antique copper frying pan
Antique church pew
French Provincial armchair
Nantucket rocking chair
Antique frame sampler
Hummel figurines
Bowl from Israel
Silver hurricane lamp
Small spinning wheel planter
Collection of antique spoons
Sterling silver goblets
Silver chafing dish
Antique cradle
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Rocking chair
Bicentennial pewter plates
Poster bed
Bowl and pitcher (gift from Aunt Louise
Watts)
Antique quilt/antique valentines
Antique quilt from defendant's grandmother
Moiri chair
Cross-stitch quilt
Bowl and pitcher (gift from defendant's
sister)
Four Lladro figurines
Various Royal Doulton figurines
Collection of "Coalport Cottages"
Defendant's clothing and personal effects,
including personal papers and books and items
which came from her family such as photograph
albums, diaries and similar personal items.
5.

The parties are ordered to agree upon a time when

defendant can receive from plaintiff the items of property to be
awarded to defendant which are currently in plaintiff's
possession, which time should be consistent with the schedule of
the daughter of the parties who shall arrange to pick up the
items for defendant*
6.

The obligations and liabilities of the parties

are to be assumed and paid as follows:

4

a.

Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay the

various mortgage obligations owing on the real properties awarded
to him, the Zion's First National Bank note liability shown on
plaintiff's Exhibit P-l, any income tax liability for his 1985
income, and any obligations which he has individually incurred
since the separation of the parties in June, 1984.
b.

Defendant is ordered to assume and pay her

student loan, her installment obligations, and any obligations
which she has individually incurred since the separation of the
parties in June, 1984.
7.

In order to equalize the marital estate, defendant

is awarded a judgment from plaintiff in the sum of $27,750
together with interest thereon at the legal rate of 12% from
February 24, 1986, until paid in full.

This obligation is

ordered to be paid by plaintiff on or before April 1, 1987, and
until paid this obligation shall constitute a lien against
plaintiff's real property located in Utah County as provided in
paragraph 3a above.
8.

As an alimony award from plaintiff to defendant,

plaintiff is ordered to pay defendant arr amount equal to one-half
of the gross bonus earned by plaintiff in 1985 which will be
received in 1986, and upon receipt of the bonus, one-half of the
gross bonus is ordered to be paid to defendant.

5
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9.

No permanent alimony is awarded, but plaintiff is

ordered to pay to defendant temporary alimony in the amount of
$500 per month for a period of one-year commencing with the month
of March, 1986, with each installment due and payable on the 1st
day of the month.
Because of plaintiff's current financial
circumstances, however, defendant is ordered to engage in no
action to reduce these installments to judgment or enforce
payment thereof through execution until April 1, 1987, in order
to allow plaintiff an opportunity to receive his income bonus for
the 1986 income year.

Each installment of alimony shall bear

interest from the date when due until paid at the rate of 10% per
annum, and if by April 1, 1987 any installments have not been
paid, then defendant shall be entitled to reduce any unpaid
installments to judgment and enforce collection through
execution.
10.

Defendant is awarded a judgment for the use and

benefit of her attorney in the amount of $5,000 plus costs
including all appraisal costs incurred by defendant in this
proceeding in the amount of $670.

This obligation for attorney's

fees and costs shall be due and payable by April 1, 1987 and
shall bear interest at the rate of 10% per annum until paid.

6
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11.

Each of the parties is ordered to execute any

documents necessary to effectuate the terras of the Decree of
Divorce when it is entered.
DATED this °[

day of

\J u. ( y

, 1986.

BY THE COURT:

ATTEST
H rwxow h«*^-*DISTRICT JUDGE
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

day of

1986, I mailed a copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce to:
David S. Dolowitz
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Attorney for Defendant.
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (8 01) 5 32-1234
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

GARY JENSE,
Plaintiff,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT MODIFYING
DECREE OF DIVORCE AND
PRIOR ORDERS OF THE COURT

vs.
Civil No. D85-702
Judge Scott Daniels

SARA A. JENSE,
Defendant.

* * * * * * * *

The above-entitled matter came before the court, the
Honorable Scott Daniels presiding, on Monday, the 24th day of
August, 1987.

The plaintiff was present in person and repre-

sented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz.

The defendant was present

in person and represented by counsel, Craig M. Peterson.

The

court, after being advised by the parties that their testimony
would be in accordance with the written pleadings and affidavits
they had filed with the court, determined with the agreement of
counsel for each of the parties, to accept that as being the testimony and then heard and considered the arguments of counsel.
Being advised in the premises, the court determined that at the

r - ^ *s
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time it entered a Decree of Divorce in this matter, July 14,
1986, it was

the intention of the court to equally divide the

marital estate of the parties and the belief of

the court was

that it had done so; however, there had been significant changes
of circumstances which rendered that division ineffective*

The

plaintiff has had a pattern for many years of being paid a substantial bonus in February or March of each year based on the
earnings of his employer for the prior year.

Following that pat-

tern, the court divided equally the bonus due in 1986 based upon
the earnings in 1985, entered a judgment in paragraph 7 of the
Decree which required payment by the plaintiff to the defendant
of $27,7 50.00 plus interest, required the payment of alimony to
the defendant
fees

in

employer

in paragraph

paragraph
received

10

of

8 of the Decree and for attorney's
the

Decree.

insufficient

receive a bonus in 1987.

In

income

and

1986,

plaintiff's

plaintiff

did

not

As a result, this court determined on

April 1, 1987, to reduce all of the sums that were due to the
plaintiff to judgment in the amount of $43,314.46 and stayed execution on that judgment until the plaintiff's situation became
more clear.

The plaintiff was terminated from his employment in

July of 1987 as the business entity for which he worked was purchased by Zions UtahBank Corp who merged that entity into its own
operations and
need

for

his

released
services.

the plaintiff
The

as there was no further

plaintiff

-2-

sold

the

home

of

the

parties in Utah County which had been valued by the court at the
time of the divorce at $150f000.00 for a gross selling price of
approximately $124,000.00 and a net selling price of approximately $119,000.00 which will produce a net proceed of sale of
approximately

$20,000.00,

as

opposed

to

the

$50,000.00

-

$60,000.00 the court believed would be produced by the sale of
that property.

In addition, the defendant, between the time of

the trial of this matter on January 14, 1986, and the entry of
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree on July 14,
1986, went to the bank where the parties had stored their silverware and removed that silverware from the safety deposit box.
The plaintiff believed that the silverware was worth $10,000.00
while the defendant believed
$4,500.00.

that it was worth

approximately

These circumstances in the opinion of the court con-

stitute a substantial change of circumstance in that the intent
of the court has been thwarted by events resulting in the defendant being awarded more than one-half of the marital estate which
requires, in equity, a modification of

the Decree and prior

orders and judgments of the court which, even after the modification, results, the court believes, in the defendant being awarded
more than one-half of the estate of the parties, thus, the court
must modify the Decree of Divorce and prior orders and judgments
of this court to provide that the defendant be awarded the silverware that she has removed from the bank deposit box and taken

-3-
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into her possession and the net proceeds of sale of the home of
the parties and that upon payment to her of the net proceeds of
sale, that all prior awards, judgments and orders of the court
requiring payment to her should be deemed satisfied and paid in
full and all financial obligations of the plaintiff to the defendant be deemed satisfied.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

The Decree of

Divorce

and all prior orders and

judgments of this court which require financial payments by the
plaintiff to the defendant shall be deemed satisfied and paid in
full upon the payment by the plaintiff to the defendant of the
net proceeds

of

sale of

the parties' home in Pleasant Grove,

Utah.
2.

The

defendant

is

awarded

all

right,

title

and

interest of the parties to the silverware that she has removed
from the safety deposit box of the parties during the pendency of
the action.
3.

Upon the completion of the payment envisioned in

paragraph 1 above, the plaintiff shall have met all of his financial obligations to the defendant and all obligations as herein
ordered in the Decree of Divorce and the orders and judgments of
this court shall be deemed satisfied and the defendant shall sign
any document necessary to, as a matter of record, declare that
these obligations have been satisfied.

-4-
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4.

Each

party

should

pay

their

own

costs

and

attorney's fees as incurred herein.
DATED this 7

day of

jQ^^_ , 1987.

SCOTT DANIELS
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS REFLECTING
THE RULINGS OF THE COURT:

Attorney for Plaintiff

CRAIG M. PETERSON
Attorney for Defendant
DSD:090187D
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Plaintiff
A t t o r n e y A t Law
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19
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MR. CRAIG M. PETERSEN
A t t o r n e y A t Law
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1

the following proceedings were had:

THE COURT:

Gary W . Jense versus Sara A . Jense

2

Motion to Amend the Decree of Divorce.

3

Do 1 o\v i t ?., you may proceed

4

MR. DOLOWITZ:

This your motion, Mr

Court want to hear testimony?

It

5

would be precisely as set forth in the affidavit.

6

affidavits and two motions before the Court rand if you w a n t ,

7

I can have that testimony and run through it on the basis thaf:

8

it's already before you

9

THE COURT:

Tvo

I see no problem in just proceeding

*® I on the basis of the affidavit unless you have a problem with
II

that.

12
"

MR. PETERSON:
I

*4 I

T H E COUT.T:
M K . L0L0..ITZ:

iJo, Your Honor.
You can

proceed

Your Honor, on the evidence that

15

we would put forward, w e ask for amendment in two areas.

16

First is, we would seek to be credited with ten-thousand

17

dollars for the silver that was taken from the safe-deposit

18

box;that the silver w a s in the safe-deposit box at the*time

19

we came before you for trial.

20

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Decree, it w a s

21

removed and taken by M r s . Jense.

22

you, it w a s in the possession of Mr.xJense. - Your ruling

23

would have left it with him.

24

to give it to her, but we want credit on the judgment.

25

second item, Your Honor, involves request that the judgment

While w e were negotiating the

At the time w e were before

She removed it.

We are willing
The

•

the matters that have been reduced to judgment,

2

$43,314.46 as of April 1st, 1337, be either reduced or deal-

3

i n g fro-.ii our view, totally terminated based on a change o?
circumstances?that is, my client has

5

lost his job,

Now, as yo\3 recall, the system wherein he was working

6

for, ultimately, Foothill Thrift, based oh his earnings from

7

the year before, he would be paid a bonus,

8

earnings, there was a substantial bonus in '85.

9
10
11

f

85 earnings there was a bonus in '86.

divided.

Based on his '84
Based on hi<f

That ' 35 bonus was

You had him pay half to Mrs. Jense and he kept half

You also entered, as part of your judgment., that there

* 2 I are $27,000 some odd dollar judgment, alimony and attorney
"

I fees-but after my client had pai^ of r the taxes that were du-'f

14

there simply wasn't enough cash, so you stayed execution on

15

the judgment until 1987, when the • 95 bonus would come in.

16

There was no

17

not produce enough, so that there

18

we were before you last, Foothill was facing receivership.

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

f

86 bonus.

What happened in 1986, Foothill di-:
COMIC)

be a bonus;and when

But now, at this point. Foothill has been taken over by
Zion's Bank.

And my client has been released.

Not only doe$

he not have a bonus for '36, that will be paid in '37, he
doesn't even have a job.

The lasfmofiey that he received

from his employment, as we set out in the affidavit, is
approximately $7 000, is what he has received.
end of his income.

That was the

He now has to look for a job.

The house

in Utah County, at least he has an offer on it.

1

2 At the time we were before you, it was $30,000.

The sale

3 price is going to produce around :3l9,000. We will get r-onva~
4

-where between nineteen and twenty-thousand dollars in cash

5 when that sale completes.

He has, on the other side, servioef

6

the debt that kept the properties together,and while those

7

assets were awarded to aim, if hi doesn't service those ^e.Jt:

8

Mrs. Jense is also a co-signer on those debts.

And we have

9 Retailed those debts in the affidavit;and she will be equallv
10 liable with them.
11
12 under the criteria that has been set out by the Jtah 3u:>re:aa
:
13 Court, v,e meet the test for a substantial chanqe in circum-

14 -stancss the> is required to modify the property provi.'-i-r s o
15 [the Decree in this case, to give her the silver and somethinq
16 to eliminate the rest of the judgment on the chanqe.

"-I-/ client

17 simply can't pay it;an5 based on the circumstance?, that he
18 Kvould have these onqoing bonuses to be able to pay this. "jud-fe-l
19

ment th at you made on the marital estate, it is not what you

20 fthouqht it was.

It has been switched by the

silver going froh

21 my client to Mrs. Jense;and has been switched by the house
22 being over £30,000 less than the Cooar ^determined that it was.
23 (Vet it based the judgment on a $27,000 to equalize the marital
24

estate.

Now, that wouldn't equalize it.

In fact, it would

25

make it even more unequal than it already is.

1

MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, We filed an Answer to

2

Amended Decree of Divorce.

3

divorce,the Court directed that Mrs. Jense would receive the

4

property, which was located in her condominium?that Mr. Jense1

5

would receive property which he had, and some specific divis-j

5

-ions, which the Court ordered on personal property awarded

7

to Mrs. Jense.

8

the Court, have not yet been made.

9

not made the transfer, but the silver which is at issue, clea

10

-rly was not in the possession of Mr. Jense at the time of thfe

11

li'ja: i:;i^ o::. thin matter ;!.:.*• 1..' 3^;an.i h^ "--mew that it '.r^z. ':\^>:*.^

12

in his possession.

13

Under the terms of the decree of

Those divisions, though they were ordered by
That is, Mr. Jense has

Knew that it belonged to Mrs. Jense.

The silver was located, at the time of the divorce,

14

in the condominium, where Ilrs. Jense

15

Lake City;and that's clear from the affidavit attached to the

16

Reply, which if-- the affidavit.

17

the last time these parties had two safe-deposit boxer-—by th

18

way, the last time either of those boxes were entered into by'

19

anyone was in March of 1CJ35, when the daughter of the parties

20

went to the safe-deposit box and removed the silverware,by thi

21

way, silverware, which Mr.

22

Mrs. Jense

23

date of the marriage;and no addition made to that silverware.

24
25

resided

here in Salt

A Pleasant Grove ban's, shows

Jense knows was accumulated by

from the time she was a sz&all child up to the

But the Court ordered that would be herr, fully one
year before this matter was heard by the Court.

That was taken from the safe-deposit box and was in
her possession.

Mr. Jense knows that•

I think the represent

-ations in the affidavits here before the Coir t today are
clearly not honest.

Those items were removed and were in he^:

possession at the time of the decree as Mr. Jense knows.

In

addition, the only reason that they were even in the safe-^epo-rit

V

JO"<

"ar- because there had been a. series of thefts

in the filpine neighborhood where they lived.

And they had

removed them an^ ^ut them in the safe-deposit box for a shori*.

the time of th~

decree of divorce.

The divorce is accurate-.

It's a misrepresentation to

^ . ^ a t 0 '*"r\ *i~**v? c — ^'\*~t -o'*•" a~v-*> t ^"'1° t b e v C'l^i^
I wasn't counsel at the time.

m%

^'~ -f^^"*'„"=• t ^ e ^.~v"v~f*.

But it's a clear misrepresent

—atio?"} tn ^-tatr- no* *' before?, fv- Cou^t

e sooe 5 al?"

h.3° eo

noon

the af .?:•'"avit r that th^*~ receive'" an.5 ackno'.rle." ~e-~, that he
has,
not.

fiat th 5.c ^r.? in h5.^ oos^e^rion at tha t i m.e«

"h: was

The evidence is clear and I have the :records here,

though I didn't submit them to the Court—I have the records
of entrance into the safe-desposit box, which will clearly
show, if the Court wants to review th^Tirthe last time anyone
entered into either one of these safe-deposit boxes was full}'
one year before this matter was tried by the Court.
the mot ion

is n ot we 11 -f oundod.

I thin::

7 think it is specious and

6

1

I think that us being here today to defend against that

2

should entitle

3

in response to his motion. Without question that's the case

4

In addition,as an aside, you'll notice froni i>.:<;. Jense' s affi-f

5

-davit, that he bases the value of that silver on a financial)

6

declaration that he himself prepared and signed.

7

signature of Sara Jense.

8

dollars on that old 1984 loan application, because he was

9

seeking a loan.

10
11

us to attorney fees and ask for that relief

Has no

de set that value at ten~chousand

3ut you'll notice also from our Answer,that

the maximum value, based on full retail suggested manufactu:

—"•

:

- J'--'-"-!

•'•-'• /--#>

} ;

-

—-••' '--- c e - ; t ; . A j L

C-VA'.
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.;a:;*

12

fir^t

13

was e n t e r e d ,

14

t"*• .*' •"• s e t t e r

15

^ion for at l e a s t

16

h p r i ! of

17

o r o n e r t y v;as i n h e r p o s s e s s i o n .

18

h a v e t h a t p r o p e r t y , w h i c h was i n h e r p o s s e s s i o n .

19

m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on t h a t p a r t .

20

i s nowhere n e a r w h a t Mr, J e n s e s a y s .

21

an a d v a n t a g e b y m a k i n g t h e s e m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t o t h e

22

here today.

23

and moct i m p o r t a n t u n d e r t h e t e r m s of t h e O r d e r ,

^;,

as

t h a t p r o p e r t y was i n h e r p o s s e s s i o n a t t h e

#

it

time

C3""v? b e f o r e t h e Cour-'" and h a d b e e n i n h e r o o s s e s ~ |

'36.

a year—March of this--*-.-wasn't h e a r d

So, from March

f

3 5 u n t i l A p r i l o^ ' 3 5 ,

until

that

The C o u r t o r d e r e d she w o u l d
Clearly a

Second p a g e , t h e v a l u e of it]
Simply t r y i n g t o

gain
Court

Both of those positions clearly indicated it is not

24

necessary to be he^e today on that particular issue. We

25

shouldn't be here today;as a result, we are entitled to

attorney's fees and should be awarded we believe in this
particular hearing*
The second matter is more disconcerting to me.

That{

is, Mr. Jense is now before the Court and represents to the
Court, that because his job status has changed, that the
Court should come in and modify an award of property, which
the Court made over a year and. a half ago, based upon the
circumstances as they existed then.

That is, the properties

as they existed then.
Mr. Jense had the advantage at that time of receiv•'Hi-'

C 'ie

~;C "lw ,

V.'.liC • .'.'.-'.: ' '.*•.:.. i"Ce 7

T. C

'.'.--- J- j.V3

oil."

"O.Lviv^.'L-i'•

JL.'C -i_O.T

sale and getting the equity out of it;but as the Court will
recall from her testimony,

Mr. Jense

Didn't actively market it.

It v.,ar- his testimony at the

simply left that home]

previous hearing in April of this year, when we were trying
to execute on this judgment that he had, that it wasn't
formally listed.

But he h<?d a friend, who had been trying t^

market it to some degree in the Utah County area.
Nov.-, I'll advise the Court, that it finally has soltjl
and Mr. Jense is suffering the same thing that everyone else
has suffered, who has received parcels of real property.
That there is some decline in the-maclcet place.
at that time was listed at

The property

approximately $145 to $150,000,

that is, at the time of the divorce.
I'll advise the Court that Mr. Jense now represents

8

1

to the Court that he has an offer on that at $119,000 \

2

That's not honest either.

3

at $124,500.

4

today by over

5

why he would make tla t representation.

6

-imately 15 % on the value the Court determined based upon

7

his representations at that time.

8

representation to the Court too, by the fact that he wanted

9

to receive that properly.

10

12

He has an earnest money contract

He has misrepresented the offering price here
$5000 and he knows that.

I am curious as to
He is down by approx-j-

I think he is boun5 by hi

He was willing to assume the ri?V

if he could get the property at that time, and assumed the

It's error at this point

to come in an" :aako a

13

modification of a property distribution based upon

14

of circumstance^ that has occurred only in th-s 7. as** ^\'*

15

months, vhen clearly I think it is res judicata completely on

16

that particular issue.

17

versus Folger, that has not just to be a change of circumrta

18

-ces,but an extraordinary change of circumstances

19

akin to misrepresentation at the time of the hearing for a

20

change of property distribution.

21

a chancre

The Court has determined in Fo:ger

somethin

That's not the case here.

If the Court is genuinely interested

and believes thaif

22

there is a basis for consideration o£-^nodif ication of a

23

property distribution, then I think we have a right to a

24

complete trial and open that issue, rather than this very

25

short hearing and these proffers of counsel, which is coming

before the Court today;but I think there is not suffij
-cient showing and there is not sufficient reason to come in
and set asi^e a property distribution, which the Court ordered
at that time;and that's what the Court did.
.Mrs. Jense didn't get alimony.

She was employed an'

the Court made property distributions and gave her this largsum judgment based upon the property distribution and properi
values as represented to the Court at the time of the trial.
The Court accepted the property values which existed then.
The change between then and now is not sufficient reason to
simply come in and amend a decree of divorce.
As I am saying, one, we don't think there is sufficient
cause for even a consideration of change of the property;but
if there is, then we believe we're entitled to a complete
trial on that issue in order to determine, in fact, whether
there was or was not some sort of misrepresentation at the
time of the hearing on the trial.
And again, I think we are here unneccessarily to defeiji:
-ing this issue and again, I think we're entitted to our fees
and costs as we have incurred them in this proceeding, Your
Honor, and based on that, we'll submit it,
THE COURT:

How much isf tTfeT judgment that's owed?

MR. D3L0WITZ:

$43,314.46 as of April 1st.

MR. PETERSON:

Plus interest.

In addition, a six

hundred dollars award of attorney's fees for our appearance

i

1
2

before the Court last time, in reality, round figures is|
forty-four thousand dollars.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. DOLOWITZ:

5
6

And you're asking that that be forgivef:

THE COURT:

That's correct.
And what would happen to the $20,000

of equity that he is going to get on the American Fork home?]

7

MR. DOLOWITZ:

In the situation that he is involvejc

8

in, that he is in a cash negative situation each month and

9

he has been using the bonuses each year to pay the debt;he

10

has been paying a second mortgage on that home. He didn't

11

get a bonus for '83.

12

have to be paid off.

13

THE COURT:

He still has on-going debts and those

So.. he would get the $20,000 to pay

14

off his debt and a negative cash-flow situation.

15

you everything you want.

16

forgiven and that would be in return,she would be able to

17

"keep the silverware?

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

MR. DOLOWITZ:
you want to call it that,

If I give

But he would get $44,000 judgment

That's correct. That would'be, ij
" our dea] " . That's our request.]

There were a nuniber of statements made about misrepresentat ipn
I don't think are true and were misrepresented to you. That]
an awful strong word for counsel

touserand I believe you

ought to look at it. To start out with, he said no alimony.|
She was awarded alimony for a year. ?/e stayed execution on
it.

That's part of the j n lane nt.

sentations.

Said th-;rs T-"^re risr^pre]'

I said he was going to net $119 on the house.

JDidn't say that it was 124*

I gave the Court the

net figure rather than the gross figures, because I thought
that wa r

important.

That'r- presented ar- though, that is sorae

kind of misrepresentation to you.

If there is any misrepres4

—ent at .ion it is thi r "business with the silver.

When Fr.

Dart and I tried this case before you on January 1 4 , 1936,
til 3 r.:Liv2:. v'd-

box.

in /.vj clients 1 s possession in a safe-deposit

She went to the safe-deposit'box after the trialrwhen

we o re sent o-^ c r

oxhikits to r~our we presented evar^thin^.

The silver was in his possession not in her condominium, yet
.• x .

?et:-::so . stan "s up :oefore you and says w^ all knew it,

but I diin't say we knew it.

But at the time the decree was

h e r~ 5'rp T.ro knew it when we were before ^ou *^n J^"^r51 of

f

^"7

If you want to talk about misrepresentation; that is

the kind of misrepresentation I think the Court should look
at and examine with particularity.

I would suggest that you

look over the t r 5.a 1 ex") .ibit s and von ' ^."!. r-e-- that t"1"^ s i."rrsr

was in my clients' possession when this matte?: was triedc
THE COURT:
MR. D0:/7 T ITZ;
THE COURT:

When was it tried?
Tried in January of 1935.
Well, according to the affidavit, the

last recorded visit was in March cff 1^35.

MR. DOLOWITZ:

|

",

The decree recites that we were

before you on the 14th of January 1935. My client said that
he had the silverware in his possession at that timorwas in
his safe-deoosit box as far as he knew;that Mrs Jense aot it

31a(? got it sometime after Mr. Dart and I were befote

1
2

you for trial. Taken it out of the box at that time. He

3

became aware of it sometime—some months after that. That

4

he and I were talking and he became aware the silverware had

5

been moved, but at the t ime that we came in before

6

trial, it was our belief that that silver was still in the

7

safe-deposit box? and I tb.-'n1" that is evidenced by an examiii-

8

-ation of the Findings of Fact that are set out too.

9

understand what our nosition is. All I am doing is to reolv

you for

3ut yo^

10

to what I think was a misrepresentation.

If you want a full

11

tri.^" on t"->? •-•stt.'-.;- ^-r-<> '••illin^ to ":• it.

12

it's necessary ;we fve covered it, I think here.

13

dealing with is a situation like Chandler versus .vei^.

14

that case the Utah Supreme Court

15

decree that'told the husband to make payments on the house

16

mortgage until it was paid off.

17

ho\ase and then sued on the decree, saying you now have to pa*

18

me the money for the

19

the money.

20

that the decree meant what it said.

21

that judgment.

22

to Chandler versus Chandler and said^jyhen you have signifi—

23

-cant change of circumstances, you have the power to amend

24

the decree?you do not

25

that type of change of circumstances occurred in this case.

7 d>net think
VJhat you're
In

was confronted with a

The wife remarried, sold th^

rest of the house, because I naid off

The trial judge, in that particular case held
You've got to pay off

The Utah Supreme Court reversed, referring

simply enforce it. And we're saying

13

You entered a ruling that found that there should be
payments from my client to Mrs. Tosara and those were based]
on certain findings, including the value of the house and
the pattern of bonuses that ray client received.

It did not

foresee him losing his job so there waid be no bonuses with
which'to be able to pay the judgment that we're talking
about;and didn't figure out the house would drop 20 or 30thousand dollars, which is more than the aramount you orderecj
paid over in judgment to equal the marital estate.

And we

are now in a situation where Mrs. Jense is employed and Mr.
Jense is not.

She's the one who is still in the solid

financial position, not my client.
THE COURT:

Well, I think it's a tough'thing to

know what to do, because it's true that the property settle-]-ment was based upon the presumption that he was going to
get a pretty big bonus, because he always had. ftnd I didr ^
think he would have got a bigger bonus than I anticipated.
On the other hand, I don't tow that it would have changed
the property settlement.

I think, based upon the equities

of the case, I am going to rule as follows:
MR, PET3RS0N:
one point.

I am going to-4

Before you rule, I wuld like to malj

He did get one big bcmu^^which was distributed

THE COURT:

That's right.

It was distributed,

that's right. And as I recall the ruling,that one was goind
to be cut in half.

That's what happened, but we anticipates

1

that he would get a bonus in 1937 based upon 1936
earnings.

And just that there is not as much money as they

thought there was going to be and I don't know what to do
about

-what I am going to do is this ,though.

the equity from the home should be to her.

I think tha

She should get

that $19 or $20,000, whatever it is and the silver should go
to her;and that's really all there is. And so, I think if
that goes to her, the remainder of the judgment, the other
$24,000 will be considered satisfied.

Now, I don't suppose

either of them are going to be too happy with that outcome.
<iR. P3T3R30N:

One point you need to be aware of.

That $24,000 satisfaction ruling, Your Honor, Mrs. Jense,
were sh^. called to testifv, would testify, as you vnade that
ruling, seven-thousand of that was furniture, which he kept
and still has ,in part of the furniture distribution, if the
Court is going to change the ruling in consideration of that
then I guess, we need to reopen all of it, so that you make
adequate furniture and personal property distributions as
well.
THE COURT:

Where is that furniture, in the house?1

MR. PETERSON:

Still in the house.

MR. DOLOWITZ:

We havefffadeTepreatedattempts to

get her to come down and pick it up. None of them have come
to fruition.
MR. PETERSON:

Talking about that which was awardeld

15

1
2

to him, not the furniture that was awarded to her.
MR. DOLOWITZ:

Thought you were talking about

3 things that are her's still in the house.
4

MR. PETERSON:

We still want those.

5

MR. DOLOWITZ:

Been asking her to come down and

6 pick them up.
7

MR. PETERSON:

We have made the request.

Simply

8 haven't facilitated on the furniture that was awarded to her.
9 Her point is very simply, they are in this judgmentt "^"©u gave
10 consideration of seven-thousand dollars in fiirniture that was
11

awarded to "i.im, when you made that judgment.

So- as a rerult

12 what happened is, he is now receiving satisfaction of $24,000|
13 while there was a seven-thounand dollars consideration in
14 there that he is still retaining.
15

THE COURT:

Well, I see your point, but you know,

16 the bottom line is, as it turned out, when all was said and
17

done, she appears to me has ended up with considerably more

18

than half of the marital estate, you know.

Maybe that's the

19 way it should be;but seems to me that the bottom line, you
20 know, after everything happened, that we didn't foresee
21

considering the drop in value of the property, considering no)

22

bonus there. What was there reallv to divide uo, she still,

23

ends up with mere than half of it and half was all she was

24

entitled to.

25

of the drop in property and I don't suppose she'll be happy.

She's having to suffer some of the disadvantage)

1

I d o n ' t suppose I w i l l e i t h e r .

The p r o b l e m

is,

2

t h e r e i s n o t a s much money a s h e t h o u g h t t h e r e . . w o u l d b e .

3

That w i l l be t h e r u l i n g .

4

attorney's

5

and I ' l l

6

t o Mr. P e t e r s o n f o r a p p r o v a l a s t o

7

f e e s w i l l be awarded f o r t h i s p a r t i c u l a r

a s k Mr. D o l o w i t z t o p r e p a r e an

MR. D0L0V7ITZ:

8

Under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,

no
hearing

Order and submit

it]

form.

I will.

(WHEREUPON t h i s h e a r i n g was

concluded.)

9
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10
11

STATU 0? UT^H

)
c

12
13

SALT LAKE COUNTY)
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Certified Shorthand Reporter of the

State of Utah;that on

August 24th, 1987, I appeared before the above-named Co\irt
and reported in Stenograph the proceedings outlined in the
preceeding 16 pages of hearing transcript and tlB t the same
is a true and correct transcription of
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